昨天2月22日，剛開學的第一天，
特地邀請中央研究院 人社中心 陳宜中副研究員來系上針對碩士生和博士生演講。
演講主題是：Social Justice & Positive Discrimination
什麼是Social Justice？翻譯為社會正義
什麼是positive discrimination ？翻譯為積極性差別待遇或積極性優惠
the practice or policy of making sure that a particular number of jobs, etc. are given to people from groups that are often treated unfairly because of their race, sex, etc. 積極區別對待政策（對因種族、性別等原因遭歧視的群體在就業等方面給予特別照顧）
但真正的Social Justice & Positive Discrimination的內涵到底為何？
宜中老師簡單的提起Social Justice History
何時人們開始談論社會正義？
哪些人在談論社會正義？
這些人怎麼談社會正義？
社會正義又是怎麼來的？
正義與慈善之間的關係為何？
助人是因為正義，還是因為慈善？
不正義與不幸之間的關係為何？
什麼是平等？齊頭平等與差別平等為何？其中的公平又為何？
陳宜中老師在昨天的演講上，都有稍稍介紹，
像是開了扇窗，邀請我們走進社會正義的門內思考。
以下是演講錄音檔，很抱歉的是僅錄一個多小時而已，
所以對於演講有任何疑問，可以在提出討論。
以下是演講講綱：
Social Justice & Positive Discrimination
陳宜中
中央研究院人社中心
The Structure
npreliminary notes on justice and injustice
nsocial justice
npositive discrimination (or affirmative action)
Preliminary Notes (I):
Justice and Charity
nDo the poor have a moral right to assistance? If the poor do have such a right, then the duty of the rich is one of justice, but if there is no such right, it is a duty of charity. Duties of justice are generally taken to be enforceable by the state, whereas duties of charity are private and a matter of individual choice. The distinction also reflects a difference of the understanding of the status of the recipient: insisting that other people observe their duties of justice seems very different to asking them for charity, which can often seem demeaning.
(From Jonathan Wolff, “Social Justice”)
Preliminary Notes (II):
Misfortune and Injustice
nExamples: the Lisbon earthquake of 1755; the fate of women; famines; disabilities…
nJudith N. Shklar: “Some misfortunes of the past, however, are now injustices, such as infant mortality and famines, which are caused mainly by public corruption and indifferences… we must recognize that the line of separation between injustice and misfortune is a political choice, not a simple rule that can be taken as a given. The question is, thus, not whether to draw a line between them at all, but where to do so in order both to enhance responsibility and to avoid random retaliation.”
(from Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice)
Preliminary Notes (III):
Justice, Injustice, and modernity
nthe rise of the modern state
nthe development of technology
nthe “social question”
ndemocratic egalitarianism
nchance and choice
npostmodernism and multiculturalism
Social Justice (I): History
nAristotle on justice: rectificatory justice; distributive justice; commutative justice
nthe right to subsistence (生存權) and the early modern ideas of “strict justice”
na distinction between justice and charity; the denial of distributive justice
Social Justice (I): History
nthe “social question” since the 19th century
nthe poor law: set up in the early seventeenth century in England and Wales to provide assistance to the sick, the old, and those in poverty. Initially, a duty fell on each parish to provide support for those in need. In the eighteenth century, workhouses were established and parishes were entitled to decline support if the poor refused to enter the workhouse. The motivations for the Poor Law were complex, including an element of religious or charitable duty to support the needy and an element of self-protection…
nAdam Smith and Thomas Paine
nJohn Stuart Mill on “social and distributive justice”
Social Justice (II):
Nozick and Hayek
nNozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)
This text is the leading philosophical statement of a libertarian approach to social justice, in which Nozick argues for the ‘entitlement theory’ of justice, comprised of three principles. A principle of justice in initial acquisition explains the circumstances under which property can be appropriated from nature. A principle of justice in transfer explains how property can justly be transferred from one person to another. A principle of justice in rectification deals with violations of the first two principles. According to Nozick, as long as a distribution of property comes about in accordance with these principles, it will be just, whatever ‘pattern’ of holdings results.
Social Justice (II):
Nozick and Hayek
nFriedrich von Hayek (1899–1992)
An Austrian Nobel Prize-winning economist and political thinker, Hayek spent most of his professional life at the London School of Economics and the University of Chicago. He did much to argue for the indispensability of the economic market in the face of limited knowledge and hence against the possibility of rational central economic planning. His major works, which have had a great influence on the development of neo-conservative thought, include The Road to Serfdom (1944), The Constitution of Liberty (1944), and Law, Legislation and Liberty (three volumes, 1973), the second volume of which is subtitled The Mirage of Social Justice.
Social Justice (III):
Basic Social Rights
nsocial rights and social justice
na decent social minimum; satisfying basic socio-economic needs
nsocial rights as “positive rights”
nsocial rights and the “welfare state”
Social Justice (IV):
John Rawls
nRawls, A Theory of Justice (1971)
An influential text in which the themes of classical ‘social contract’ thinking—especially that of Immanuel Kant—are revived in justification of liberal egalitarian principles of justice guaranteeing equal liberties to all, equal opportunity for all, and a distribution of economic goods that makes the worst off as well off as possible. Rawls argues that these principles would be the rational choice of people placed behind a veil of ignorance, denying to them knowledge of characteristics—for example, sex, race, and class—that can be (dis)advantaging in the real world, but which ought not to be (dis)advantaging in the just society.
Social Justice (IV):
John Rawls
nthe first principle: equal liberty
nthe second principle: fair equality of opportunity; the difference principle
npractical implications of Rawls’s two principles of justice
Social Justice (V):
Equality of Opportunity
n“career open to talent”; “meritocracy”
n“desert” and “merit”
nchance and choice
Positive Discrimination (I):
Nagel on Equal Opportunity
nCategory 1. Formal Equality of Opportunity : “careers open to talents,” requiring inter alia the elimination of legal barriers to persons of color, women, and so forth as well as the punishment of private discrimination against them.
nCategory 2. Aggressive Formal Equality of Opportunity : self-conscious impartiality achieved through sensitivity training, external monitoring and enforcement (e.g., by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), outreach efforts, and so forth as a possible supplement to category 1.
nCategory 3. Compensating Support : “special training programs, or financial backing, or day-care centers, or apprenticeships, or tutoring,” all designed to compensate for color- or gender-based disadvantages in preparation, social support, and so forth and by doing so to help recipients compete more effectively for university admission or employment.
Positive Discrimination (I):
Nagel on Equal Opportunity
nCategory 4. Soft Quotas: “compensatory discrimination in the selection process,” such as adding “bonus points” to the selection indices of persons of color or women in the college-admissions or hiring processes, but without the use of explicit quotas.
nCategory 5. Hard Quotas: “admission [or hiring] quotas,” perhaps “proportional to the representation of a given [historically oppressed] group in the population.”
Positive Discrimination (II):
Reasons for Positive Discrimination
ngroup-based historical injustices
ncompensational justice
nfair equality of opportunity
nRonald Dworkin on black doctors
nDavid Miller on forward-looking “desert”
Positive Discrimination (III):
Reasons against Positive Discrimination
nMatt Cavanagh, Against Equality of Opportunity, 2002
n“meritocracy”; “career open to talent”
nmarket competition; class politics and the middle-class “enclosure” movement
ncontinuing controversies over group-based strategies of equalization
Positive Discrimination (IV):
Some Concluding Notes
npositive discrimination (or affirmative action) is one, but not the only, strategy for rectifying group-based injustices.
na more balanced approach addressing distribution, recognition and difference remains to be developed.
Positive Discrimination (IV):
Some Concluding Notes
nShklar: When we can alleviate suffering, whatever its cause, it is passively unjust to stand by and do nothing. It is not the origins of injury, but the possibility of preventing and reducing its costs, that allows us to judge whether there was or was not unjustifiable passivity… Nor is the sense of injustice irrelevant. The voices of the victims must always be heard first… to attend to their interpretations of the situation… If the victim’s suffering is due to accident or misfortune but could be remedied by public agents, then it is unjust if nothing is done to help.
The End
Thank you very much for listening
延伸閱讀：
Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice, Yale University Press, 1990.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971.
David Miller, Principles of Social Justice, Harvard University Press, 1999.
陳宜中，2003，〈國家應維護社會權嗎？評當代反社會權論者的幾項看法〉，《人文及社會科學集刊》第15卷第2期（2003年6月），頁309-338。
陳宜中，2004，〈社會正義vs.市場正義：論自由主義思想裡的兩種正義觀點〉，收於張世雄編《社會正義與全球化：福利與自由主義的反思》（2004年9月），頁67-99。台北：桂冠。
下次愛思想論壇預告：
論壇主題：變遷社會中的需要、風險和生命歷程
Needs, Risks and the Life Course in a changing world
論壇時間：99年3月8日 13:30-15:20
論壇地點：SS305
參加論壇前請閱讀：
張世雄
1996 《社會福利的理念與社會安全制度》。(二刷，1999)台北：唐山出版社。第一章到第三章(PDF)。http://www.rchss.sinica.edu.tw/publication/ebook/journal/08-02-1996/08_2_9.pdf
2009 《社會福利概論》(空中大學)：第一章第一節。
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